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Abstract Incubators are a prominent way to support technology based start-ups. Yet, it
remains unclear to what extent these incubators enhance start-up performance, nor is it
known through which mechanisms this would occur. In this paper we test two
mechanisms to explain the relationship between incubation and the amount of invest-
ments raised by early stage start-ups as performance measure. The ‘hit maker’ mech-
anism refers to beneficial effects of the direct transfer of resources and organizational or
business knowledge from the incubator to the start-up. The ‘network broker’ mecha-
nism refers to the benefits that start-ups enjoy from being connected to external funding
sources through the incubator’s networks. We test which of these mechanisms contrib-
ute to the performance of early stage start-ups. Our data comes from a unique survey
from 935 entrepreneurs with early-stage technology based start-ups in Western Europe
and North America. We find that incubators have a positive effect on (1) the amount of
funding that start-ups attract and (2) the ability of start-ups to attract funding from
formal investors and banks. Moreover, our results provide evidence for the network
broker mechanism, but not for the hit maker mechanism.
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Introduction
Incubators are one of the most prominent means to support early-stage technology-
based start-ups (Ahmad and Ingle 2013; Bergek and Norrman 2008; Oakey 2012).
Incubators aim to facilitate the survival and growth of these start-ups by providing them
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with a comprehensive range of services, such as shared office space, specialized
knowledge, and a network of clients and investors (Bergek and Norrman 2008;
Hackett and Dilts 2004). Still, it remains unclear whether these potential benefits also
translate into greater start-up performance. Whereas some studies suggest that
incubators have a positive impact on the performance of start-ups (Stokan et al. 2015),
others have found the impact of incubators to be nonexistent (Tamásy 2007;
Westhead and Storey 1994) or even negative (Schwartz 2013). These contra-
dictory findings have been ascribed to several challenges associated with
measuring the performance of incubators, which include limited availability of
data (see e.g. Barbero et al. 2012; Colombo andDelmastro 2002; Schwartz 2013; Stokan
et al. 2015), inconsistent use of performance measures (Bergek and Norrman 2008;
Hackett and Dilts 2004; Schwartz 2013), and sample selection biases (Aerts et al. 2007;
Schwartz 2008).
A more fundamental challenge is to identify the theoretical mechanisms through
which incubators contribute to the success (or failure) of start-ups. Measuring the
incubator’s impact on start-up performance has little value if studies are not able
explain how incubators make such an impact (Ahmad 2014; Hackett and Dilts 2004).
The literature identifies two distinct theoretical mechanisms that explain the incubator’s
impact on start-up performance: direct support and networking (Amezcua et al. 2013;
Bergek and Norrman 2008; Patton 2013).
Direct support refers to the direct transfer of resources from the incubator to the start-
up. These can be tangible resources like office space or funding, but also intangible
resources like business knowledge that is transferred with help of experienced incuba-
tor managers, coaches, pitching training sessions, and workshops (Van Weele et al.
2016a). By using these support services, incubators can directly improve start-up
performance, and can thus be seen as Bhit makers^.
The networking mechanism refers to the activities of incubators to improve a
start-up’s network, for example by providing referrals or organizing networking
events (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi 2005; Collinson and Gregson 2003; Warren et al.
2009). These services help start-ups to acquire the necessary social capital to
gain access to resources in the incubator’s network that enhance performance
(Davidsson and Honig 2003). Through this mechanism, the incubator serves as a
Bnetwork broker .^
In this paper, we study which of these two mechanisms contribute to the perfor-
mance of early-stage technology-based start-ups. Our data come from a unique survey
of 935 entrepreneurs who founded early-stage technology-based start-ups in Western
Europe and North America. We measure performance as the monetary amount of
investments raised by the start-up, as this has a high signaling value for future
performance (De Clercq et al. 2006; Rothaermel and Thursby 2005; Vohora et al.
2004). By studying the combined interaction effect between incubation and the use of
different funding sources, we explore whether the two mechanisms explain start-up
performance. We find that incubators have a positive effect on (1) the amount of
funding that start-ups attract and (2) the ability of start-ups to attract funding from
formal investors and banks. In addition, our results provide evidence for the presence of
a network broker mechanism, but not for the hit maker mechanism. Incubators may use
these insights to better understand how they have a positive effect on the performance
of start-ups.
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Background
Incubators
While incubators have been around since the 1950s, they became widespread in
the 1980s. Over time, the concept has evolved considerably. Initially, incubators
were seen as economic development tools for regions (Grimaldi and Grandi
2005). This first generation of incubators primarily offered basic services such
as office space, facilities, and parking (Barrow 2001; Bruneel et al. 2012). In
the 1980s, when it became clear that innovation and technology are important
aspects of the economy, incubators found a new purpose in focusing on
technology-based start-ups (Bruneel et al. 2012; Schwartz and Hornych 2010).
It also became evident that a lack of business experience was an important
barrier to start-up success. Hence, the second generation of incubators expanded
their focus to facilitating organizational learning by offering professional con-
sulting services, coaching, and mentoring (Bruneel et al. 2012). With the
emergence of the IT sector and the Internet in the 1990s, the purpose of
incubators shifted again. From having been a government-dominated phenome-
non, private incubators started to emerge (Grimaldi and Grandi 2005). This third
generation of incubators started to emphasize network services (Bruneel et al. 2012;
Hansen et al. 2000; Lalkaka 2002). During recent years, the number of incubators grew
substantially. Between 2007 and 2013, the number of incubators in Europe has increased
approximately fivefold (Salido et al. 2013). In 2016, there were about 7000 incubators
worldwide (InBIA 2016).
Despite the growth in incubators, there is still no consensus on the definition of an
incubator (Aernoudt 2004; Bergek and Norrman 2008; Phan et al. 2005). The rapid
growth of the incubator phenomenon has led to a great diversity in the incubator
population, with incubators using different revenue models, providing different forms
of support, and targeting different subgroups of start-ups (Vanderstraeten and
Matthyssens 2012). However, there are still some baseline assumptions that can be
made about contemporary incubators in Western Europe and North America. Hackett
and Dilts (2004, p. 71) conclude that B[m]ost researchers agree that incubators-
incubation represent a systematic method of providing business assistance to firms in
the early-stages of their development^. So regardless of the ultimate purpose of the
incubator, improving the performance of the accepted start-ups is the main direct aim of
incubators.
The increasing popularity of incubators suggests that they are effective tools
to help start-ups. Yet the empirical evidence for this is mixed. Some studies
find that start-ups in incubators are more likely to survive, with 80 to 90 %
still in business after five years (European Commission 2002) or after leaving
the incubator (Aernoudt 2004). Others find that incubators have a positive
effect on start-ups’ growth (Stokan et al. 2015). Yet Bserious doubts have
emerged about the general effectiveness of business incubation^ (Tavoletti
2013, p. 423), since some find the incubator’s impact on start-up performance
indicators like growth in profit, sales, or employment to be almost nonexistent (Pena
2004; Tamásy 2007; Westhead and Storey 1994) or even negative when it comes to
survival (Schwartz 2013).
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Start-up performance
The difference in results can partly be explained by the use of different measures for
start-up performance. Typical performance measures for start-ups are employment
growth, gross profit, business volume, survival, successful exit, goal attainment, eval-
uation of success by the founder, completion of idea or planning phase, and the size of
investments raised (see Eveleens et al. 2016 for an overview). Given that we are
examining early-stage start-ups, most of these measures are not applicable. For example,
many early-stage start-ups have not recorded any sales or profit, hired employees, or
made a successful exit. Measures like goal attainment or evaluation of success by
founders are subjective and at risk of psychological biases (Richard et al. 2009).
Investment size
We use investment size as an applicable performance measure. Early-stage start-ups
often require substantial amounts of funding to finance costly research and develop-
ment prior to making sales (Westhead and Storey 1997). Raising funds from external
stakeholders is considered to be an important milestone in the start-up’s development,
as it is a signal of viability (De Clercq et al. 2006; Rothaermel and Thursby 2005;
Vohora et al. 2004). Consequently, the amount of investment raised is a commonly used
measure in studies that explore the performance of technology-based start-ups (see e.g.
Batjargal 2007; Shane and Stuart 2002) or incubators (see e.g. Radojevich-Kelley and
Hoffman 2012; Rothaermel and Thursby 2005).
Funding sources
Investments can be raised from several sources (Cassar 2004). Incubators often encour-
age start-ups to attract venture capital from investors, as these are more likely to invest in
high-risk ventures like start-ups, and can offer valuable advice (De Clercq et al. 2006).
Consequently, investors ask for high returns on their investment, and often demand
shares of the company or some form of control (Hellmann 1998). Possible alternative
funding sources are government subsidies, which are usually focused on R&D (Van
Rijnsoever et al. 2014). Examples are the European Framework Programs and the Small
Business and Innovation Research program in the United States. A third source of
funding are banks. These provide loans, and are often risk averse, preferring physical
assets to secure the loan in case of bankruptcy (Hall 2002). Fourth, crowdfunding is Ban
initiative undertaken to raise money for a new project proposed by someone, by
collecting small-to-medium-size investments from several other people^ (Ordanini
et al. 2011, p. 444). Two more informal funding sources are Bfriends, family and fools^
(Kotha and George 2012), and own investments. The alternative sources are often less
preferred by incubators. We take them into consideration as they might fit the strategy of
entrepreneurs who do not wish to give up equity to investors (Wasserman 2008).
Incubation
There is a broad variety of services that incubators can offer, depending on the goal of
the incubator (Bergek and Norrman 2008; Schwartz and Hornych 2008), and
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conditions in the surrounding entrepreneurial ecosystem (Spigel 2015; Steinz et al.
2015; Van Weele et al. 2016b). Incubator services include, but are not limited to, shared
equipment, seed capital, coaching, training to develop business skills, organization of
networking events, access to professional service providers (e.g. legal), and access to
providers of venture capital (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi 2005; Bruneel et al. 2012; Soetanto
and Jack 2013).
Scholars have started to categorize these services according to their anticipated
outcome (Ahmad 2014; Amezcua et al. 2013; Bruneel et al. 2012). By doing so, the
field moved toward understanding the mechanisms that explain how these services
affect start-up performance. This can help to explain the contradictory empirical
evidence for the benefits of incubation. The literature identifies two distinct theoretical
mechanisms that explain the incubator’s impact on start-up performance: direct support
and networking (Amezcua et al. 2013; Bergek and Norrman 2008; Patton 2013).
Direct support
Direct support stems from the first and second generation of incubators. It refers to the
provision of tangible and intangible resources from the incubator to the start-up
(Amezcua and Grimes 2013; Van Weele et al. 2016a). Direct support is offered in the
form of tangible resources like office space, shared equipment, or funding. It also
includes the transfer of intangible resources such as business knowledge, which is
transferred with the help of experienced incubator managers; pitching training sessions;
andworkshops. This helps start-ups to focus on the development of their business (Patton
and Marlow 2011) and enables them to develop stronger, more convincing business
propositions (Patton 2013; Rice 2002; Van Weele et al. 2016a). The result is better start-
up performance. As such, this mechanism portrays incubators as Bhit makers^.
Networking
The networking mechanism is an important trait of the third generation of incubators. It
refers to the activities of incubators to improve a start-up’s network (Bøllingtoft and
Ulhøi 2005; Collinson and Gregson 2003; Warren et al. 2009). Incubators using this
mechanism are providing referrals or organizing networking events. Through these
services, start-ups are more visible, more aligned, and better connected to important
actors external to the incubator, such as investors or banks (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi 2005;
Hansen et al. 2000). The affiliation with an established, reputable incubator also
contributes to the legitimacy of start-ups, which further helps start-ups to convince
investors (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi 2005; Rao et al. 2008). Accordingly, the social capital
engendered in the incubator’s networks can help start-ups gain access to resources that
in turn help to improve performance (Davidsson and Honig 2003). This mechanism
thus portrays the incubator as a Bnetwork broker .^
Methods
Assessing the influence of incubation on the performance of start-ups is associated with
a number of methodological challenges. First, there is a lack of comparable data on
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incubators and the performance of their portfolio start-ups because start-ups supported
by incubators often are not required to report any financial statements, individual
incubators use various performance measures, and incubators often do not
publicly disclose their metrics (Bergek and Norrman 2008; Hackett and Dilts
2004; Schwartz 2013). Second, start-ups are screened prior to being admitted
into the incubator (Aerts et al. 2007). This makes it difficult to disentangle the incuba-
tor’s contribution from its selection mechanism. Third, many datasets focus on one
specific region or country, which makes it difficult to generalize the findings to the
incubator population in general (see e.g. Barbero et al. 2012; Colombo and Delmastro
2002; Schwartz 2013; Stokan et al. 2015).
To alleviate these problems, we rely on data from an international survey among
entrepreneurs. This allows us to measure start-up performance and the necessary control
variables directly across different countries. A possible weakness of this approach is that
the data is self-reported. Therefore, we base the measurement in the questionnaire as
much as possible on scales that have been successfully used in previous studies, such as
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2015), and the
Panel Study on Entrepreneurial Dynamics (Davidsson 2008). A second problem with
survey data is that it is problematic to distinguish between cause and effect (Campbell
and Stanley 1966). Investments can be raised prior to, during, and after incubation.
However, the more investments a start-up raises, the less need it has to be incubated. We
argue below how we use this insight to build a model in which the relationship between
incubation and investments is plausibly causal.
Data collection
We collected data among 935 early-stage technology-based entrepreneurs. Data were
collected via an online business-to-business panel of a large European marketing
agency. A major challenge for any study that tries to collect data among founders of
start-ups is that the Bincidence rate^ is very low when relying on random sampling
(Davidsson 2008). For the countries that were targeted, the BTotal Early-Stage
Entrepreneurial Activity^ (TEA), which measures the percentage of the adult popula-
tion that is either a nascent entrepreneur or an owner-manager of a new business
(Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2015), is only between 5 and 13 %. Of these
entrepreneurs, only a fraction are starting a technology-based start-up (Davidsson
2008). Therefore, we relied on quota sampling, with quota set by country. Moreover,
given that founders of start-ups are more likely to be highly educated (Wadhwa et al.
2008), we chose to direct our sample toward higher educated individuals.
Respondents had to meet three criteria to participate in the questionnaire. First,
respondents had to be actively starting a business which they would wholly or partially
own. Second, respondents had to be starting a technology-based start-up, which was
defined as a new firm whose business is based on the exploitation of technological
know-how through the creation of new products and services (Bergek and Norrman
2015; Trimi and Berbegal-Mirabent 2012). Third, to weed out mature companies,
respondents were screened out if their business had been paying salaries for more than
two years. Appendix 1 shows in detail the criteria we used to include respondents in our
sample. The selection of sectors was made according to the Eurostat classification
based on NACE codes (Eurostat 2009; see Appendix 2). Respondents were surveyed in
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Western Europe and North America. We selected these areas because they have a high
concentration of both technology-based start-ups and incubators (Aerts et al. 2007;
WEF 2015). To increase the representativeness of our sample, we weighted cases from
each country in accordance with the country’s TEA in relation to its population.
Appendix 3 shows the number of respondents and case weights per country.
Although the United States had the largest number of respondents, the country was
still underrepresented in the sample. Ireland was most overrepresented. The case
weights correct for these differences.
The average age of the respondents ranged from 20 to 69 years (weighted
mean = 37.72: SD = 8.74); a large majority (74.9 %) were male, and 70.7 % had a
university degree. These descriptive statistics are in line with previous studies on
technology-based start-ups (Wadhwa et al. 2008). Respondents received a small mon-
etary reward for their participation.
Measurement
We first discuss the dependent variables: investment size (monetary amount of invest-
ments) and funding sources. We then discuss incubation as our main independent
variable, and the control variables. The latter were selected based on the criterion that
they should be related to both the dependent and independent variables. Table 1
provides the exact levels of the investment size variable and its descriptive statistics.
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the remaining variables.
Investment size
The questionnaire asked how much money entrepreneurs’ start-ups had raised, includ-
ing the investments of the entrepreneur. Respondents could answer on a seven-point
scale that ranged from Bless than $1000″ to Bmore than $500,000″. The scale was
adjusted to the currency in the respondent’s country of origin (Euro, US dollar, pound
sterling or Swiss franc). The exact numbers are based on the currency exchange rates
and rounded to an interpretable number.
As mentioned above, causality is a major challenge for determining the influence of
incubation on attracting investments as both processes can occur simultaneously. The
process of raising investments can also continue post-incubation. However, given that
incubators tailor their support toward early-stage start-ups that have typically attracted
no or only small amounts of investment (Aernoudt 2004; Bergek and Norrman 2008;
Pauwels et al. 2015), it is unlikely that a start-up would go into an incubator after having
raised a monetary large amount of investments. Therefore, we created a Blarge invest-
ment size^ variable that only captures the investments worth more than $100,000. All
investments smaller than this number were coded as B0^ while the remaining values
were unchanged.We assume $100,000 to be a reasonable cutoff value for the early-stage
start-ups in our sample. However, our results also hold for the cutoff value at $200,000.
Funding sources
The questionnaire asked respondents which sources their start-up had used to raise
funds (with the percentage of respondents answering Byes^ in parentheses): Investor
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(23.6 %), Government subsidy (11.2 %), Bank loan (39.9 %), Crowdfunding (13.1 %),
Friends and family (38.1 %), Own investment (47.0 %).
Incubation
Incubation is our main independent variable. Some authors make an explicit distinction
between accelerators and incubators (see e.g. Cohen and Hochberg 2014; NESTA
2011). They do so because they see incubators as providers of office space and basic
services, and accelerators as focusing on intangible services (e.g. mentoring and
networking). However, modern incubators are not merely providers of shared office
space, but organizations that provide a comprehensive range of support services
(Aernoudt 2004; Bergek and Norrman 2008; Bruneel et al. 2012). These services
include those that are also provided by accelerators, such as mentoring and networking.
Further, there is great diversity among the models and definitions of both incubators
(Aernoudt 2004; Bergek and Norrman 2008; Bruneel et al. 2012) and accelerators (see
e.g. Brown and Mawson 2016; Pauwels et al. 2015). BIncubators^ and Baccelerators^
are both seen as Bumbrella terms^ (Aernoudt 2004, p. 127; Pauwels et al. 2015, p. 1)
that largely overlap (Bosma and Stam 2012). As in practice accelerators and modern
incubators can be very similar, we do not make an explicit distinction.
The questionnaire asked respondents whether they were familiar with the concept of
Bincubators^ and/or Baccelerators^ prior to participating in this study, and whether they
were part of such a program at the time of the study or had been in the past. Based on
this, we constructed a nominal incubation variable with four levels: 1) not familiar with
incubators or accelerators (43.8 %); 2) familiar with incubators or accelerators,
but has never been part of a program (31.9 %); 3) currently part of an incubator
or acceleration program (15.1 %); and 4) has been part of an incubator or acceleration
program in the past (9.2 %).
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of investment size
Item Total investments Response
How much money did your
business raise (in total,
including your own investment)?
Less than €1000/ Less than $1000/
Less than £749/ Less than CHF 1000
41 (4.4 %)
€1000 – €9999/ $1000 – $9999/
£750 – £7499/ CHF 1000 – CHF 9999
95 (10.1 %)
€10,000 – €49,999/ $10,000 – $49,999/
£7500 – £34,999/ CHF 10,000 – CHF 49999
172 (18.4 %)
€50,000 – €99,000/ $50,000 – $99,000/
£35,000 – £74,999/ CHF 50,000 – CHF 99,000
194 (20.8 %)
€100,000 – €249,999/ $100,000 – $249,999/
£75,000 $ – £199,999/ CHF 100,000 $ –
CHF 249999
209 (22.3 %)
€250,000 – €499,999/ $250,000 – $499,999/
£200,000 – £349,999/ CHF 250,000 – CHF 499999
120 (12.8 %)
More than €500,000/ More than $500,000/
More than £350,000/ More than CHF 500,000
47 (5.0 %)
No answer 58 (6.2 %)
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Team size
Larger teams of entrepreneurs may have more time to dedicate to the start-up, more
technical and business experience, and a larger network. Having more team members
also increases the team’s ability to generate and develop ideas (Ruef 2002). Larger start-
up teams may thus establish more successful businesses than single founders or smaller
teams (Chandler and Hanks 1994; Roberts 1991), and, consequently, raise more money.
Larger teams also have more Bmouths to feed^, which further increases the need to
raise external investments (Klepper 2001). We also expect a relationship between team
size and incubation. The start-up team is an important selection criterion for incubators
(Aerts et al. 2007; Bergek and Norrman 2008; Pauwels et al. 2015) and incubators pay
close attention to the team’s size. Incubators are typically hesitant to take on start-ups
with single founders, but also have an aversion against teams that are too large (NESTA
2014; Pauwels et al. 2015) due to the difficulties associated with managing a large start-
up team (Curral et al. 2001). Team size was measured as the number of people in the
business’s founding team.
Start-up maturity
Start-ups grow andmature over time. This is commonly measured by gestation activities
that entrepreneurs engage in while establishing a business (Dombrovsky et al. 2011;
Liao and Welsch 2008). These activities can take place prior to, during, and after
incubation. Incubators typically support start-ups in early phases (Bergek and
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistic
1 Investment size Median = €50,000 – €99,000
2 Large investment size Median = less than €100,000
3 Not familiar, never been part 43.8 %
4 Familiar, but never been part 31.9 %
5 Currently part 15.1 %
6 Have been part 9.2 %
7 Team size Mean = 3.65, SD = 2.41
8 Start-up maturity Mean = 4.35, SD = 3.00
9 Industry experience Mean = 8.97, SD = 6.90
10 Entrepreneurial experience Mean = 0.23, SD = 0.71
11 Age Mean = 37.72, SD = 8.74
12 Gender (Female) 25.1 %
13 Subsidy 11.2 %
14 Loan 39.9 %
15 Crowdfunding 13.1 %
16 Investor 23.6 %
17 Friends & family 38.1 %
18 Own investment 47.0 %
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Norrman 2008), but incubators often do expect a minimum level of maturity prior to
being admitted. Start-ups that are more developed can also be expected to bemore active
in seeking funds and to need more investments. Liao and Welsch (2008) identified 26
gestation activities. To avoid respondent fatigue, the questionnaire asked in which of the
following 12 activities the start-up engaged in during the last 12 months: 1) Formally
registering the business; 2) Preparing a written business plan; 3) Organizing a start-up
team; 4) Devoting themselves full-time to the business (more than 35 h per week); 5)
Developing a proof of concept or working prototype; 6) Applying for a patent/copy-
right/trademark; 7) Defining market opportunities; 8) Hiring employees; 9) Asking
financial institutions or other people for funds; 10) Receiving money from the sale of
goods or services; 11) Purchasing materials, equipment, facilities, or other tangible
goods for the business; 12) Discussing the new business’s product or service with
potential customers. The total number of activities was used as this variable.
Industry experience
Entrepreneurs with more experience in the industry of their start-up are more likely to
have access to resources, technical experience, and business experience, as well as have
a larger network and more credibility (Bosma et al. 2004; Cooper et al. 1994). Start-ups
founded by entrepreneurs with extensive industry experience may be more attractive to
incubators, and these start-ups may be more successful in fundraising. This variable
was measured as the number of years the respondent had worked in the start-up’s
primary industry (Mitchell and Shepherd 2010).
Entrepreneurial experience
Entrepreneurs who have founded a start-up before likely have more business experi-
ence and a larger network than start-up founders with no entrepreneurial experience
(Colombo and Grilli 2005; Dahlqvist et al. 2000). Entrepreneurs in incubators tend to
be first-time entrepreneurs (Patton 2013; Rice 2002), as experienced entrepreneurs have
less need of the incubator’s services. Experienced entrepreneurs may also be more
successful in fundraising. This variable was measured as the total number of businesses
in which the respondent was directly involved during the start-up phase.
Age
During the course of a career, people have the opportunity to increase income and save
upmoney. Consequently, older people have more money available than younger people,
which they can use to invest in their own business. This reduces the initial need to seek
investments. Younger entrepreneurs likely have less resources, less business experience,
and a smaller business network. This might motivate them to join an incubator more
than older entrepreneurs. For this reason, we include age as a control variable.
Gender
Gender and entrepreneurship is a heavily studied topic (Poggesi et al. 2015).
Technology-based entrepreneurship and incubators can be seen as Bmasculine^
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environments in which women are more likely at a disadvantage (Marlow and
McAdam 2012; Marlow and McAdam 2015). This is partly expressed by the
use of investments as performance measure. Attracting investment is typically
more difficult for women entrepreneurs, as investors tend to be biased toward funding
men (Poggesi et al. 2015).
Sector and country
As financial demands, regulations, start-up support by incubators and entry require-
ments vary by sector (Malerba 2002), we coded a dummy for each sector. Regulations,
finance opportunities, required investment sizes, and start-up support also vary per
country (Ács et al. 2014; Singer et al. 2015), so we coded dummies for countries as
well. See Appendices 2 and 3 for the descriptive statistics.
Analysis
We fitted a series of ordinal and binary logit models. In the ordinal logit models,
investment size and large investment size are the dependent variables. The first step
only enters the control variables. The second step adds the four-level incubation
variable and the funding sources as independent variables. In the third step, interaction
effects between the incubation variable and the use of funding sources are added, which
tests whether incubated entrepreneurs tend to raise more funding from a particular
source than non-incubated entrepreneurs. In the binary logit models, the six types of
funding sources are the dependent variables. The first step enters the control variables,
and the second step adds the incubation variable to the model. For all models, we used
a chi-square test to assess whether each step improved the model. As a model
performance indicator, we report the pseudo R2 by McFadden (1974). Appendix 4
presents the full correlation matrix.
To test if incubators are network brokers, hit makers, or both, we apply the following
reasoning. If incubation has a positive relationship with specific funding sources and
these funding sources contribute to investment size, then this is evidence that incubators
support start-ups in gaining funding from these sources. This would mean that incu-
bators serve as network brokers. However, this does not mean that incubated
entrepreneurs gain more funding from a source than a non-incubated entrepre-
neur who uses the same source. If the interaction effect between incubation and
specific funding sources is positively and significant, this means that incubated entre-
preneurs gain more funding from a source than non-incubated entrepreneurs. This
implies that incubators are hit makers.
Results
Table 3 presents the results of the ordinal logit models predicting investment
size and large investment size. The McFadden R2 values range between 0.1 and
0.18, which are reasonable model fits. The addition of the incubation and the
funding source variables leads to a significant model improvement, as do the
interaction effects.
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The models for investment size and large investment size are very similar. Step two
reveals that in both instances being part of an incubator, or having been part of an
incubator, has a positive effect on the size of investments. The second step also shows
that the size of the investments is primarily positively associated with bank loans and
investments, and negatively associated with friends and family. The interactions in step
three between incubation and bank loans or investors are not significant. This means that
incubated entrepreneurs do not get more funding from these sources than non-incubated
entrepreneurs who use the same sources. Having been part of an incubator in the past in
combination with crowdfunding is associated with more investments and more large
investments, while currently being part of an incubator in combination with crowdfunding
is only associated with more investments.1 It is worth noting that having been part of an
incubator in the past combined with using friends and family or own investments is
associated with lower investments. Being familiar with an incubator, but not being a part
of one, in combination with using government subsidies, investments from friends and
family, and own investments leads to more investments. Finally, the control variables
show that team size, start-up maturity, and industry experience are all positively related to
investment size, while entrepreneurial experience, age, and gender are not significant.
Table 4 presents the results of binary logit models predicting use of funding sources.
The McFadden R2 values range between 0.11 and 0.24, indicating reasonable to good
model fits. The addition of the incubation variable significantly improves model fits for
all funding sources except for government subsidies.
Compared to the reference category (not familiar with incubators and never been part
of an incubator), entrepreneurs who are familiar with an incubator program, but who are
currently not part of an incubator, are least likely to make use of bank loans. There are no
significant differences between the other categories of incubation and making use of
bank loans, nor are there any effects for crowdfunding. However, entrepreneurs who are
or have been part of an incubator are more likely to use investors than those who have
never been part of an incubator. Friends and family are used less by entrepreneurs who
were part of an incubator in the past, while entrepreneurs who are familiar with
incubators, but not a part of one, are more likely to use their own investments.
It is noteworthy that larger teams use more of all kinds of funding sources except
crowdfunding (no effect) and own investments (negative effect). Start-up maturity is
positively related to all funding sources except for friends and family. Industry expe-
rience is positively related to loans only, while entrepreneurial experience has small
negative effects on using government subsidies and investors. Younger entrepreneurs
are more likely to seek loans and crowdfunding for their business. As expected, older
entrepreneurs make more use of their own investments. Finally, women entrepreneurs
are less likely to use crowdfunding than their male counterparts.
Discussion
Our results show that incubation is associated with larger investments, and that
incubation is positively associated with using loans and investors as funding sources.
1 Being part of an incubator in combination with crowdfunding is positively associated with investments at the
10 % level.
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These two sources are also associated with the largest investment sizes. The non-
significant interaction effect means that there is no evidence that incubated start-ups
raise more investments than non-incubated start-ups from these sources. The incubator
provides access to investors and banks, but a non-incubated start-up who has access to
these sources raises as much funding from these sources as incubated start-ups. This
suggests that incubators serve as network brokers, but not as hit makers.
Also, entrepreneurs who are familiar with incubation but who have not been part of an
incubator rely more on own funding or their friends and family, as well as government
subsidies for large investments. This finding is consistent with the argument about
network brokerage. Non-incubated entrepreneurs do not have access to sources like
banks or investors, and are thus forced to find alternative funding sources.
This study suffers from a number of limitations. First, we associated the two mech-
anisms for performance with incubation services based on prior literature. However, the
questionnaire did not measure these services directly, which means that we did not fully
take into account heterogeneity among incubators, nor were we able to differentiate
between quality of the services offered. Our results only apply to contemporary incuba-
tion in general. Future research should study how the type and quality of services are
associated with performance. Second, to ensure anonymity and ease of filling out the
questionnaire, it did not measure the investments per funding source directly. This could
have resulted in a finer grained image of relationships studied. However, this likely would
have led to a lower response and less reliable measurements. Third, we did not
include two control variables that potentially further explain investments or
being selected by an incubator: the quality of the product idea and the quality of
the start-up team (Bergek and Norrman 2008). Both variables are difficult to measure in
a reliable manner through a questionnaire. We encourage future studies to explore the
characteristics of each start-up’s team in more detail, for example by looking at the
team’s composition in terms of competences, background, ambitions, and networks.
Conclusions
The incubation literature has provided conflicting evidence on the impact of business
incubation. Studies have reported positive (Aernoudt 2004; European Commission
2002; Stokan et al. 2015), negative (Schwartz 2008, 2013), or no effects (Pena 2004;
Tamásy 2007; Westhead and Storey 1994) on various performance measures. Our study
provides evidence for a positive effect of incubation on investments. This study also
assessed two different mechanisms that can explain the effect of incubation (Amezcua
et al. 2013; Bergek and Norrman 2008; Patton 2013). Thereby it helps to fill the gap in
the literature of how incubators influence start-up performance (Ahmad 2014; Hackett
and Dilts 2004). The results show that the prime value of an incubator for raising
investments lies in its ability to connect start-ups to specific funding sources. Services
like referrals and network events, or the sheer fact of being connected to a reputable
incubator, give start-ups an important advantage. Our results also indicate that, in
general, supporting activities directly aimed at gaining more investments (such as
pitching training) have limited effect. This does not mean that supporting activities
associated with hit-making—such as coaching, mentoring, or workshops—are all in
vain. Raising investments is only one performance measure that is primarily applicable
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to early-stage start-ups (Eveleens et al. 2016). As start-ups mature, they need to
eventually become profitable to return these investments. This is when conventional
performance measures such as turnover, profit, and survival become important. It is
quite possible that the hit-making support activities do have a positive influence on
these kinds of performance measures, but this is an area for further research. Also, it is
possible that some incubators offer these activities with such a high quality that they
form an exception to the rule. However, in general, we conclude that incubators serve
as network brokers and not as hit makers.
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Appendix 1
Selection questions for respondents
1. Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business? This includes any self-
employment or selling of goods or services to others.
& No Not included in sample
& Yes
2. Would you consider the new business to be a technology-based start-up?
A technology-based start-up is a new firm whose business is based on the exploitation of technological know-
how through the creation of new products and services. Examples include the development of a new drug or
software service.
& No Not included in sample
& Yes
3. In the past 12 months, in which of the following activities have you engaged during the development of
your business?
Tick all that apply:
& Formally registering the business
& Preparing a written business plan
& Organizing a start-up team
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& Devoting yourself full-time to the business (more than 35 h per week)
& Developing a proof of concept or working prototype
& Applying for a patent/copyright/trademark
& Defining market opportunities
& Hiring employees
& Asking financial institutions or other people for funds
& Receiving money from the sales of goods or services
& Purchasing materials, equipment, facilities, or other tangible goods for the business
& Discussing the new business’s product or service with potential customers
& None of the above: Not included in sample
4. Has the new business paid any salaries, wages, or payments in kind, including your own?
BPayments in kind^ refers to goods or services provided as payments for work rather than cash. Payments in
kind do not include stock options.
& No
& Yes
If previous question was answered BYes^:
5. For how long has the new business been paying salaries, wages, or payments in kind, including your
own?
& For 0 to 3 months
& For 3 to 6 months
& For 6 to 12 months
& For 1 to 2 years
& For 3 to 5 years Not included in sample
& For more than 5 years Not included in sample
6. Do you, or will you, personally own all, part, or none of this business?
& All
& Part
& None Not included in sample
7. Is or will the new business be a subsidiary?
A subsidiary is a venture of which another organization owns more than 50 % of voting shares.
& No, the new venture is not the subsidiary of another organization
& Yes, the new venture is a subsidiary of another organization Not included in sample
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Biotechnology & pharmaceuticals 20
Chemistry 30
Clean technology 69
Coke and petroleum products 6
Electrical engineering & equipment 45
Energy 33
Fabricated metal products 7
Functional or processed food 18
ICT & computers 87
Information systems 157
Machinery 13




Other non-metallic mineral products 1
Photonics 1
Repair & installation machinery 19
Reproduction recorded media 14
Robotics 15
Rubber and plastic products 7





Weapons & ammunition 17
Other, please specify: 124
Total 935
Appendix 2: Respondents by sector
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Appendix 3: Respondents and case weights per country













Austria 8.71 8,623,073 751,070 37 0.280
Canada 13.04 35,851,774 4,675,071 109 0.592
Belgium 5.4 11,267,581 608,449 38 0.221
France 5.34 67,107,000 3,583,514 125 0.395
Germany 5.27 81,197,500 4,279,108 125 0.472
Ireland 6.53 4,635,400 302,692 65 0.064
Netherlands 9.46 16,928,000 1,601,389 67 0.330
Switzerland 7.12 8,279,700 589,515 24 0.339
United Kingdom 10.66 64,800,000 6,907,680 104 0.916
United States of America 13.81 322,210,000 44,497,201 241 2.546
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